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AGGREGATEEXPERIENCE
BECAUSE of their inclusiveness, measures of aggregate experience,
such as over-all default rates, realized yields, and loss rates, reflect
the diverse fortunes of all bond issues held by the investing public
—those that fared badly and those that fared well. They cover
street railway and rail bonds, electric utilities and industrials;
issues rated high grade by the investment rating agencies and
those rated low; issues eligible for savings bank and trust fund
investment and issues ineligible for such investment. Since the
aggregate measures reflect the behavior of all issues under a wide
variety of circumstances, they are free of the selective effects of
investor judgment as to quality, industry, and timing, as well as
of the regulatory rules and statutes governing the disposition of
institutional funds. They therefore serve as useful yardsticks
against which particular programs and portfolios may be ap-
praised, and provide an essential background for the more de-
tailed analyses of subsequent chapters.
Immediately after the summary of findings, we consider the ag-
gregate returns obtained on bonds purchased at offering and held
to extinguishment, and secular and cyclical drifts in default and
loss rates of bonds offered in different periods. The next section
analyzes the returns obtained from defaulted issues, on the as-
sumption that they were sold on the date of default, or alterna-
tively, that they were purchased on that date and held over periods
of different lengths in the future. The chapter closes with an ex-
amination of the yield and loss experience of bonds held over
selected chronological periods. The principal breakdowns relate to
major industry and size components, but some material is pre-
sented on the behavior of issues of the minor industry divisions.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
During the full period 1900—194S, $71.5 billion par amount of
straight corporate bond issues were offered to and purchased by
the domestic investing public. Of that total, slightly over 10 per-
cent was paid in full at maturity and slightly under 20 percent
went into default. The remainder was either extinguished by call
or was still outstanding at the close of the period studied (JanuaryAGGREGATE EXPERIENCE 73
1, 1944). Realized yields on bonds purchased at offering and held
to extinguishment necessarily equaled the promised yields at
offering for the one-tenth paid at maturity, so that losses were zero
for that group. On the other hand, capital losses occurred on the
one-fifth that went into default, but these were just equaled by
capital gains that were realized on the called issues or had accrued
on those still outstanding on January 1,1944. The weighted
average promised yield on total offerings was 5.6 percent, and so
was the realized yield from offering to extinguishment (Table 10).
Thus if all of the bond issues in the study are conceived of as
pooled into a single portfolio held from offering to extinguishment
or 1944, the portfolio would have suffered no loss in current dol-
lars. This is a truly remarkable finding in view of the fact that
the record spans a period of forty-four years that includes a great
war and a great depression.
Marked discrepancies occurred, however, between the experi-
ence records of issues differing in period of origin and of extin-
guishment. Generally speaking, during periods of rising interest
rates a relatively large proportion of issues were paid in full at
maturity while relatively few were called. Realized yields rose
with money rates in such periods, but call premiums were in-
sufficient to offset default losses, so that capital losses occurred.
Contrariwise, in periods of falling interest rates few issues were
paid in full at maturity but many were called. Even though de-
fault losses were substantial, call premiums more than offset them,
and substantial capital gains occurred.
Analysis of the over-all performance of corporate bonds by
minor industry group reveals the role played by the percent called
and the percent defaulted in the determination of levels of loss
rates and of realized rates of return. On the other hand, the yield
ultimately realized was found to be virtually independent of the
yield promised at offering, and the loss rate was influenced by
the promised yield to only a minor extent. To put the matter
differently, over 90 percent of the variation in loss rates from one
minor industry group to another can be "explained" (in the sta-
tistical sense) by differences in realized yields and only 10 percent
by differences in promised yields. It follows that industry varia-
tions in loss rates are dominated by realized yields; and since the
realized yields are substantially dependent upon the call and de-
fault experience of the issues within industry groups, the loss rates
are similarly determined. Accurate estimation of loss rates would74 AGGREGATE EXPERIENCE
therefore seem to pivot largely upon the accuracy with which one
is able to forecast future interest rate changes (i.e. call premiums)
and the business cycle (i.e. defaults).
Our records fail to reveal a close relationship between the de-
fault and loss experience of corporate bonds in minor industry
groupings and the corresponding rates of long-term industrial
growth. They do, however, provide some evidence in support of
the belief that issues floated toward the end of major bull market
swings have poorer records than those offered soon after deep
depressions.
One of the most striking and at the same time most systematic
findings reported in the chapter pertains to the behavior of issues
in the default experience record. The experience of such issues
in each of the major industry-size groups indicates that realized
yields from offering to default were consistently below those from
offering to extinguishment. Moreover, capital losses were general
on bonds sold at default, whereas capital gains were equally gen-
eral on bonds purchased at default and held to extinguishment.
Thus, in the light of subsequent events, the policy followed by
many regulatory authorities of encouraging financial intermedi-
aries, such as savings banks and life insurance companies, to sell
bonds promptly at default or to write them down to market
proved more costly (or embarrassing) to the institutions involved
than a more liberal policy would have been. Losses were greatest
on the defaults of the thirties, but they occurred on earlier defaults
as well.
The experience record, when analyzed for assumed four-year
periods of investment and selected combinations of them, on the
whole confirms what was observed for bonds held from offering
to extinguishment. Over the longer chronological periods the
realized rate of return was significantly affected by the default
and call experience prevailing within the period. Over shorter
periods, however, investor experience was governed by the par-
ticular set of market prices that happened to rule at the begin-
fling and at the end of the period. We conclude that the success-
ful short-term trader must forecast correctly short-term changes in
capital values. For the long-term investor the principal problem
is that of predicting default experience and major swings in basic
yields. Later chapters will investigate the extent to which these
crucial variables are related to various measures of bond quality.LiFE-SPAN PERFORMANCE 75
LIFE-SPAN PERFORMANCE OF CORPORATE BONDS:
THE COMPREHENSIVE RECORD
Our most global measures of investor experience on bonds pur-
chased at offering and held to extinguishment are presented in
Table 10, which shows average yields and loss rates for bonds in
major groups. The averages were obtained by weighting the yields
and loss rates for the individual offerings by the corresponding par
amounts. Separate estimates are presented for regular and irregu-
lar offerings (see the third paragraph below), and the regular offer-
ings are further classified into those that defaulted and those that
were extinguished by contractual methods or were still in good
standing at the end of the period studied (January 1, 1944). The
first two sections of the table pertain to the large and small issues
in the offerings experience sample, and the remaining sections to
universe estimates obtained by adjusting the sample values for
discrepancies among the sample and universe distributions of
offerings by defaultstatus and method of extinguishment.
The weighted average promised yield to maturity on all large
issues in the experience sample was 5.3 percent, as compared with
a realized yield from offering to extinguishment of 5.4 percent.
The difference, 5.3 percent less 5.4 percent, or —0.1 percent, in-
dicates that investors actually received a higher rate of yield than
was promised on such issues, in spite of the heavy default losses
on corporate bonds in the thirties. In effect, a portfolio comprised
of a representative sample of large straight corporate bonds offered
during the period 1900—1943 showed capital gains through call
premiums and market appreciation of issues still outstanding at
the end of the period in excess of all losses on defaulted bonds,
the net amount of the gain averaging 0.1 percent per annum (ten
yield basis points) on the par amount of the offerings.
Equally large capital gains accrued on the 95 percent of all
large offerings that were regular offerings, but the promised and
realized yields on them, although quite attractive by recent stand-
ards, were somewhat lower than on the total. The breakdown of
the par amount of regular offerings into the 13 percent paid at ma-
turity, 37 percent called, 16 percent defaulted, and 29 percent
still outstanding on January 1, 1944, reveals why net capital gains
were obtained over the period. Realized yields necessarily equaled
promised yields for bonds paid in full at maturity, so that losses
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































promised yields were suffered on defaulted bonds, as compared
with somewhat smaller gains on the called bonds and those still
outstanding in 1944. On the other hand, two-thirds of all offer-
ings fell in the latter two groups, and gains on them more than
offset losses on the 16 percent that defaulted.'
The irregular offerings (5 percent of the par-amount total for
the sample of large straight issues) were principally contract modi-
fications and exchanges growing out of the heavy corporate re-
organizations of the late thirties and early forties. At the time
they appeared they sold in a depressed market at substantial
discounts, but the majority either had appreciated substantially
by the end of the period studied or had previously been retired at
a premium. Thus the promised and realized yields on irregular
offerings alone reached the fantastically high levels of 12.2 and
13.1 per cent, respectively, and capital gains averaged out at 0.9
percent per annum.
Comparison of the yields and loss rates for the sample of small
issues with the corresponding figures for the large issues sample
reveals interesting similarities and differences. For both groups,
the realized yields were highest on irregular offerings and called
bonds, and lowest on defaulted issues and those outstanding in
1944. On the other hand, the promised yields, on each class of small
issues were above comparable yields on large issues, suggesting
either that the smaller issues were offered in periods of high in-
terest rates or that the market considered them to be somewhat
riskier investments at date of offering than the large issues. As a
matter of fact, Table 10 shows that the latter was borne out by ex-
perience, since the small issues had a higher proportion of de-
faults, and lower realized yields on defaulted issues, than the
large issues. For issues that did not default, however, realized
yields on small issues were either equal to or above the correspond-
ing yields on large issues.
To examine this question further, and at the same time to ob-
tain global estimates for all straight bonds, a further step was
'It is an interesting exercise to manipulate data of this type to determine
the effect of contingencies of various types on the over-all loss rate. For ex-
ample, since 16.4 percent of the large regular offerings defaulted with a loss
rate of 3.5 percent, the contribution of defaulted issues to the over-all loss rate
was 0.57 percent (16.4 percent of 3.5 percent). In later chapters, life-span de-
fault rates for issues in different quality classes are presented, as well as the
corresponding loss rates on defaulted issues; if the reader desires, such data
may be combined by multiplication to determine the contribution of defaults
to the total loss rate for any particular class of issues.LIFE-SPAN PERFORM4NCE 79
ventured in Table 10 by adjusting and combining the sample
values on the basis of universe totals. The estimates were obtained
by weighting the yields in each of the two samples by the corre-
sponding percentages from the universe distributions of offerings
classified by default status and method of extinguishment, thus in
effect correcting for discrepancies between the sample and uni-
verse distributions. The resulting estimates for all large offerings
and for large regular offerings are very close to the unadjusted
sample values; but owing to the increased weight given defaults,
the small issues show substantially higher loss rates and lower real-
ized yields for the regular offerings.
Comparison of the adjusted values for large and small issues
shows that on the whole the small issues were undervalued at
offering when regular and irregular offerings are combined. (The
adjusted average realized yield for all small offerings was 6.1 per-
cent as against 5.5 percent for all large.) On the other hand, the
small regular offerings, which are the ones ordinarily acquired
by institutional investors, appear on the whole to have been
accurately priced in the market at offering. The yields on the
regular offerings after adjustment to universe totals show that the
higher promised yield on the small issues (5.8 versus 4.9 percent)
was almost entirely offset by the high loss rate (0.9 versus —0.1
percent), so that the realized yield was nearly as high for the small
issues as for the large (4.9 versus 5.0 percent). We shall return to
this matter again in later sections of the report (see particularly
Chapter 8) in an attempt to determine whether there is any con-
sistency in the market's appraisal of large and small issues or
whether the differences observed are ascribable simply to market
conditions at the time of flotation.
It will be noted from the last section of Table 10 that the ad-
justed average realized yield for all offerings combined (large issues
plus small issues; regular offerings plus irregular offerings) exactly
equaled the average promised yield, so that the net loss rate was
zero on the average for all issues offered in the period studied. On
the other hand, small losses accrued on the regular offerings, which
are the only ones ordinarily taken up by conservative investors.
Allowing for that fact, for the slender size of the sample of small
issues, and for the possible size of the sampling error, an annual
accrual rate of about 0.1 percent would seem to be a fairly accu-
rate estimate of the reserve that would have been required for all80 AGGREGATE EXPERIENCE
straight issues floated between 1900and1944.2Therecord thus
indicates an extremely high level of performance for domestic
corporate bonds as a whole, considering the fact that the measures
reflect the abnormally high default losses of the Great Depression.
On the average and over the long pull, premiums on called bonds
and market appreciation on outstanding issues were equal to losses
on defaulted issues, so that investors obtained approximately the
returns promised at offering. This of course does not mean that
the market's valuation mechanism was perfect for each issue or
for selected groups of issues: as we have seen, irregular offerings
were undervalued by the market at offering, and possibly also the
small issues. And as the next section indicates, the market has been
subject to extreme aberrations in its valuation of bonds, depend-
ing upon the periods in which they were floated and extinguished.
Nevertheless, the over-all record of corporate bonds offered in
the forty-four-year period gives remarkable evidence of the re-
siliency and long-run stability of this class of investments.
Comparisons by Period of Offering
and of Extinguishment
Like most global estimates the materials presented thus far gloss
over important differences within the aggregates. The promised
yields on corporate bonds are of course influenced by the general
tenor of the market at the time of offering as well as by the quality,
marketability, and various other characteristics of individual is-
sues. Realized yields and loss rates reflect such factors as well,
and, in addition, the entire set of economic forces impinging upon
the bond market and the issuing corporations up to and includ-
ing the time of extinguishment. As Tables 7 and 8 of the preced-
ing chapter have indicated, such factors have fluctuated violently
during the forty-four years studied. To hold them constant, in
order to examine the influence of the economic environment on
corporate bond behavior, it is necessary to group investments into
fairly long but roughly homogeneous periods by date of offering
and of extinguishment.
2Aloss rate of 0.1 percent would, of course, be too high for some periods
and not high enough for others. The reader may well wonder to what extent
the level of performance depends on the year in which the record begins and
terminates. Computations from Table 11 show that if only issues offered and
extinguished before 1944 are included, the gain rate of 0.1 percent for all
large issues changes to a loss rate of the same amount. On the other hand,
it becomes a gain rate of 0.2 percent if only offerings and extinguishments be-
fore 1932 are included.LIFE-SPAN PERFORMANCE 81
TABLE 11—Life-span Yields and Loss Rates, and Percents
Called and Defaulted, 1900—1943,






























Out. 19001900—19434.3 4.1 0.2 10.1 35.1 2,281.1
1900—1931 1900—19316.2 6.4—0.2 49.9 17.2 12,904.9
1900—1931 1932—19435.4 4.6 0.8 65.4 23.1 14,613.9
1932—1943 1932—19434.9 6.0—1.1 95.1 3.6 5,111.5
Before 1944Out. 19444.8 5.3—0.5 0.0 14.2 20,269.6
Out. 1900 1900—19314.2 4.1 0.1 9.0 28.3 1,595.1
Out. 1900 1932—19434.4 4.1 0.3 12.850.8 686.0
1900—1909 1900—19315.0 4.5 0.5 21.433.6 3,575.7
1910—1919 1910—19316.3 5.7 0.6 30.3 18.8 4,195.7
1920—1931 1920—19316.9 8.3—1.4 84.5 4.7 5,133.5
1900—19091932—19434.6 4.4 0.2 26.227.1 995.5
1910—1919 1932—19435.2 5.1 0.1 45.626.4 1,921.1
1920—1931 1932—19435.5 4.6 0.9 72.0 22.2 11,697.3
1932—19391932—19396.4 7.7—1.3 90.9 5.8 1,964.2
1932—19391940—19434.0 5.0—1.0 97.4 2.4 2,992.7
1940—19431940—19433.4 5.1—1.7 100.0 0.0 154.6
Out. 1900 Out. 1.9444.1 3.9 0.2 0.025.1 1,511.1
1900—1909Out. 19444.4 4.1 0.3 0.0 30.1 1,809.1
1910—1919Out. 19444.9 4.1 0.8 0.0 33.3 1,818.3
1920—1931Out. 19445.3 3.7 1.6 0.023.6 5,365.2
1932—1939Out. 19445.3 6.4—1.1 0.0 0.3 6,106.3
1940—1943Out. 19443.9 7.7—3.8 0.0 0.0 3,659.6
par amounts of irregular offerings
Out. =Outstanding.
Data, based on Tables 182 and 183 of Statistical Measures, and on special
tabulations, cover large issues in the offerings experience sample, except that
(made during corporate reorganizations
etc.) were excluded before computing the percents called and defaulted.
Yields and loss rates are weighted averages with par amounts of included
offerings as weights.
aIncludesissues extinguished before maturity by other contractual methods
as well as by call..82 AGGREGATE EXPERIENCE
One such grouping is set forth in Table 11, which presents
yields and loss rates for the large straight issues in the experience
sample classified by selected major and minor periods of offering
and extinguishment. When studying the table it is well to keep in
mind the following schedule of the principal characteristics of the
bond market during the period covered:
January 1, 1900: A time of extremely low interest rates; rela-
tively few outstanding issues had call provisions.
January 1, 1900—December 31, 1909: A period of low but rising
interest rates; relatively few calls and defaults.
January 1, 1910—December 31, 1919: A period of high and rising
interest rates, with bond yields reaching a crest toward the end
of the period; few calls and few defaults.
January 1, 1920—December 31, 1931: A period of relatively high
interest rates, with bond yields falling abruptly from abnormally
high levels at the beginning of the period, then drifting gently
downward during the middle and late twenties, and rising
abruptly again at the end of the period; as interest rates drifted
downward and the stock market boomed, the volume of issues
called and extinguished from the proceeds of stock offerings grew;
defaults on corporate issues rose sharply toward the very end of
the period.
January 1, 1932—December 31, 1939: A period of rapidly falling
interest rates, with extremely heavy defaults on the lower-grade
issues and heavy calls and refundings of the better grades.
January 1, 1910—December 31, 1913: A period of low and stable
interest rates, the result of the wartime pegging; a second large
wave of refundings, and a reduced volume of defaults.
To divide the offerings into the minor periods presented in the
table, they were first grouped by offerings dates into the periods
indicated, and were then further classified on the basis of whether
or not the issue was extinguished before or after January 1, 1932.
That date makes a convenient benchmark for the classification of
extinguishments, since it marks the end of an era of moderate de-
faults and refundings, and the beginning of a period in which de-
faults and ref undings were extremely heavy. Since we wish to com-
pare the experience of bonds extinguished before and after the
beginning of World War II, offerings in 1932—39 were further
classified according to whether the issue was extinguished before orLiFE-SPAN PERFORMANCE 83
after January 1, 1940. Finally, weighted average yields and loss
rates were calculated for the minor periods and for selected longer
periods. Similar measures for other long periods can be obtained
from the table by combining minor-period data weighted by the
relevant par amounts.
The yields for all large corporate issues are reproduced in the
first line of Table 11; they reflect the experience on all issues out-
standing January 1, 1900 or January 1, 1944, as well as issues of-
fered and extinguished between these dates. Since many large in-
stitutional investors enter the secondary bond market infrequently,
the assumption of purchase of outstanding issues at the beginning
of the period and of liquidation at the end is not entirely appro-
priate for them, and we therefore show the two groups separately
in the next two lines of the table. Issues outstanding in 1900 or
1944 carried somewhat lower promised and realized yields than
those offered and extinguished in the intervening years, and capi-
tal gains on them were quite high (0.4 percent per annum), prin-
cipally because of the market appreciation of issues outstanding
in 1944. Since the amount outstanding on one or the other of
these dates was roughly two-fifths of the total par amount in the
large issues sample, their inclusion had a small but important
effect on the aggregate loss rate. When they are excluded the loss
rate rises from —0.1 percent (inferring capital gains) to 0.1 per-
cent (inferring capital losses). The implication would seem to be
that investors who are unable to take advantage of market appre-
ciation on outstanding issues (but are required by statute to write
securities down to market under certain circumstances) would
require somewhat higher loss reserves than those needed by in-
vestors generally.3 So far as can be judged from the record before
us, a reserve accumulated at the rate of 0.1 percent on book value
would have been adequate to take care of default losses on large
issues offered and extinguished within the period studied.
Examination of the first column of Table 11 shows that on the
whole yields promised at offering followed the average pattern
of yields on issues outstanding in the market (see also Table 12,
which compares promised yields at offering with those on high-
grade outstandings). Promised yields were quite low on issues out-
standing in 1900, rose with the general level of money rates
through the period ending in 1931, and then fell to extremely low
levels during the last period shown. Realized yields, which are
SLifeinsurance companies, for example, are required by law to carry de-
faulted bonds and those rated "below grade" at market. Cf. pages 145 f.84 AGGREGATE EXPERiENCE
equal to promised yields only for issues paid in full at maturity,
departed rather markedly from promised yields in most periods,
running above them when a large proportion of the par-amount
total was extinguished by call, and falling below them in periods
of heavy defaults. The loss rates, or differences between the prom-
ised and realized yields, also reflect differences in call and default
experience.
Realized yields and loss rates for the major periods into which
the data are divided show successive periods of good and bad ex-
perience. Issues outstanding at the beginning of the century were
selling at high prices (low yields), few had call provisions, and
relatively few of the callable issues were actually called during
the subsequent period of rising rates of interest. (Note, however,
the slight rise in the percent called for such of these issues as were
extinguished during the period of falling interest rates after 1932.)
In addition, many of the issues outstanding in 1900 were rail is-
sues, which defaulted heavily during the Great Depression. As a
result, realized yields fell below the already low level of yields
promised at the beginning of the century, and capital losses re-
sulted.
On the whole, bonds that were both offered and extinguished
before the Great Depression had a favorable experience record
(an average promised yield of 6.2 percent, a realized yield of 6.4
percent, and a capital gain rate of 0.2 percent). It will be noted
that the record was particularly good for bonds offered and ex-
tinguished in the twenties. Many of them were initially offered at
the high rates prevailing at the beginning of the decade, and were
subsequently called and refunded with the proceeds from stock
offerings. Moreover, few bonds offered during the twenties went
into default before 1931. It follows that investors who purchased
these securities obtained sizable premiums above the ample yields
promised at offering.
In sharp contrast with bonds offered and extinguished before
1932, the record is particularly unfavorable for bonds floated be-
fore 1932 that were subject to the heavy default risks of the Great
Depression (an average promised yield of 5.4 percent, a realized
yield of 4.6 percent, and a loss rate of 0.8 percent). Although a
substantial proportion of the par-amount total was called in the
late thirties, call premiums were not sufficient to offset heavy losses
on issues going into default. Loss rates were particularly high for
bonds offered in the twenties and still outstanding in 1931, subjectLIFE-SPAN PERFORMANCE 85
to the acid test of the Great Depression. The record becomes quite
favorable again on bonds offered during the thirties. Many of the
issues floated after 1931 were called before January 1, 1944, were
refunded into new issues, and the latter had reached substantial
premiums in the market by the end of the period studied. As we
have seen, issues offered at substantial discounts during the re-
organizations of the thirties (the irregular offerings of Table 10)
also sold up as earnings coverage improved during the early war
years. In consequence of these developments, the realized rates of
return on bonds floated after 1931 were considerably above the
yields promised at offering, and large captial gains resulted.
One of the most interesting implications of Table 11 is the loose
relationship between yields promised at offering and yields real-
ized on bonds offered and extinguished in selected periods. The
matter is approached in a slightly different way in Table 12, which
shows promised and realized yields for large issues grouped by
period of offering, irrespective of the date of extinguishment. As
the table indicates, promised yields for large issues (whether in-
clusive or exclusive of those still outstanding January 1, 1944)
rose and fell over the decades with the basic market yields on high-
grade bonds. The risk premiums or spreads between the average
promised yields and the market yields on high grades, it is true,
fluctuated somewhat with the changing climate of the market.
Thus for all issues the average risk premium was 0.5 percent in
1900—1909, over 1.3 percent under the disorganized conditions of
the 1932—39 period, and about 1 percent for the other periods.
Nevertheless, general trends in promised yields were roughly
similar to those in basic market yields.
Realized yields, however, were closely dependent upon subse-
quent default and call experience (compare the percents called
and defaulted in Table 11 with the realized rates of return) as
well as upon the particular prices or yields prevailing at the time
of flotation. Table 12 shows the life-span realized yields for all
issues regularly increasing from one period of offering to the
next, but this is principally the result of the large proportion of
bonds offered in the thirties and forties that were still outstanding
and selling at premiums in the market in 1944. When outstand-
ing issues are eliminated, the realized yields show a somewhat
closer relationship to basic market yields at offering. In fact, as
the classical theory of investment values might lead us to expect










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































closer to the basic yields in the decades through the twenties than
were the promised yields; but, contrary to that theory, they were
further from the basic yields in the thirties and early forties. The
reason is that of the offerings made in the first two decades (a pe-
riod of rising interest rates) about 45 percent of the issues, by par
amount, were extinguished by payment in full at maturity,
while on the remainder call premiums just failed to match
default losses, so that small capital losses occurred. Bonds of-
fered in the twenties and later were frequently called but less
frequently paid at maturity or defaulted. Losses on offerings in
the twenties that later defaulted (bonds representing 17 percent
of the par amount offered then and extinguished before 1944)
more than offset the premiums on those that were called (76 per-
cent), so that again there was a small net capital loss on such
offerings. Up through the twenties, therefore, the realized yields
were closer to the basic rates on high grades than were the prom-
ised yields. On the other hand, substantial capital gains occurred
on bonds offered and extinguished in the thirties and early forties,
and even higher capital gains occurred if offerings still outstand-
ing in 1944 are included. Toward the close of the period studied,
therefore, realized yields pulled away from the basic rates, and
rose above the promised yields. It would appear, then, that real-
ized yields are influenced by basic yields at offering but that in
some periods the relationship is a loose one, owing to call pre-
miums and default losses.
All of this may perhaps be generalized into the following im-
portant tentative conclusions: During periods of rising interest
rates few issues are called, many are paid off at maturity, and
though realized yields may rise with money rates, call premiums
may be insufficient to offset default losses, and substantial capital
losses may result. In periods of falling money rates the reverse
appears to be true: few issues are paid off at maturity, many are
called, and even though default losses may be substantial, call
premiums may be more than sufficient to offset them, and capital
gains may occur.
The failure to detect a closer relationship between basic yields
on high-grade investments and realized rates of return would ap-
pear to raise questions of some importance for economic and ac-
tuarial theory. According to the classical theory of investment
values, as expressed for example by Alfred Marshall, the promised
yield at offering (aside from minor cost and marketability con-88 AGGREGATE EXPERIENCE
siderations) is compounded of the basic riskiess rental rate on
high-grade securities outstanding at the time (roughly, high-grade
bond yields) and a risk premium judged to be adequate, on the
average, to take account of default losses, call premiums, etc.4
Aside from statistical disturbances and errors of forecast, there-
fore, both the promised and realized yield should be related to
basic money rates, the realized yield on the average being equal
to the basic money rate, and the promised yield to the basic rate
plus a risk premium, assuming of course that investors at offering
have some notion of the risk of default, etc. The data of Table
12 suggest that promised yields at offering do in fact contain a
common basic interest component as the theory would indicate.
On the other hand the averages shown in the table, which appear
to cover periods broad enough to damp out the effects of most ran-
dom aberrations, reveal that the realized yields on the whole ex-
ceeded the rates promised on the best grades of bonds offered.
Moreover, in the later years realized yields even exceeded the gross
returns promised on all straight bond investments at
More detailed data covering shorter periods, to be published in
Statistical Measures, also fail to reveal a persistent and stable rela-
tionship between basic rates and realized returns. The practical
implications of this finding may be rather far-reaching, particu-
larly when it is recalled that the capitalization rates normally used
for ordinary business purposes are geared to the yields ruling on
the best grades of bonds outstanding in the market.6
4 See the discussion of the difference between gross and net interest in his
Principles of Economics (London, 1930), pp. 588 if.
5 Realized yields would doubtless be more closely related to basic yields on
high grades outstanding at the time of flotation of the original issues if it
could be assumed that successor securities (refunding issues for bonds extin-
guished by call; issues received during corporate reorganizations for bonds
extinguished following default) had the same maturity dates as those of the
original issues. Such, however, is seldom the case in practice. Fully one.fifth
of the defaulted issues were settled by exchange on some date later than that
of the original issue. Similarly, most refunding issues had a maturity date
later than that of the original issue.
6 Yields used by actuaries in computing insurance premiums and reserves
provide an interesting example. These yields, while conservative, tend to follow
current accounting estimates of earnings, which are in turn related to prom-
ised rather than to realized rates of return. Since the volume of investments
already on the books of most life insurance companies is large as compared with
the volume of new investments over a year or even a span of several years,
there is, of course, a considerable lag in company earnings behind promised
yields on new investments. Because insurance policies are long-term contracts
and a possible long-run adverse movement in promised yields must be guarded
against, it is usual practice to set the assumed yield well below the yield shownLiFE-SPAN PERFORMANCE 89
Comparisons by Major and Minor Industry Group
Aggregate measures of investor experience on bonds offered by
obligors in major industry groups are presented in Table 13, and
similar materials for the minor components are given in Table 14.
The promised and realized yields of the first table are conserva-
tive estimates since the higher yielding small issues are excluded,
along with irregular offerings and issues still outstanding on Jan-
uary 1, 1944. Table 14 also covers only large issues; but, to obtain
the largest samples possible for the minor industry components,
the irregular offerings are included. If desired, yields and loss rates
for the minor groups may be combined by weighting to obtain
broader groupings comparable to those of Table 13.
Of the three major industry groups covered by our records, the
railroads turned in by far the poorest performance. Since many of
the rails were offered in the early part of the century when interest
rates were low, and since they were judged in that period to be
high grade by most investors, their weighted average promised
yield at offering was the lowest of the three major groups (4.9
percent, as against 5.3 percent for utilities, and 5.6 percent for
industrials). Moreover, a relatively large proportion, by volume,
subsequently went into default, and a relatively small proportion
was called, so that the average realized yield on rail bonds also fell
well below the others (4.4 percent, as against 5.5 percent for
utilities and 6.0 percent for industrials). Since default losses on
large rail offerings outweighed call premiums, a substantial loss
rate of 0.5 percent was recorded.
Large industrials exhibited the best record of the three major
groups. Industrial bonds were first offered in large volume during
the early twenties, when interest rates were unusually high, and
many Issues were shortly retired from proceeds of stock offerings;
others were later called and refunded at the low interest rates pre-
vailing in the thirties. In consequence, the proportion of indus-
trials called was high; call premiums outweighed default losses;
and realized yields rose above the yields promised at offering.
On the whole, investors enjoyed substantial capital gains on their
industrial holdings (an average capital gain rate of 0.4 percent
per annum).
as earned on the company's books. The absence of a close relationship be-
tween realized yields and promised yields provides further evidence of the
need for conservatism in selecting the assumed interest rate for actuarial
calculations of insurance premiums and reserves.90 AGGREGATE EXPERIENCE
TABLE 13—Life-span Yields and Loss Rates for Issues Paid






of LargeinFull at By AfterAmount
Issues .TVlaturity CallaDefault(millions)
Distribution of Par A mount
Allindustries 100.0% 20.8% 60.2%19.0% $33,734.2
Railroads 100.0 44.9 27.1 28.0 8,870.2
Public utilities 100.0 13.9 71.5 14.6 14,554.2
Streetrailways100.0 21.5 11.4 67.1 1,311.1
Allothers 100.0 13.1 77.5 9.4 13,243.1
Industrials 100.0 9.8 72.8 17,4 10,309.8
PromisedYield
Allindustries 5.3 5.1 5.3 5.6
Railroads 4.9 4.8 5.1 -4.9
Public utilities 5.3 5.4 5.2 5.7
Street railways 5.5 5.4 7 .4 5.2
All others 5.3 5.4 5.2 6.0
Industrials 5.6 5.9 5.4 6.4
RealizedYield
Allindustries 5.4 5.1 6.5 2.1
Railroads 4.4 4.8 6.1 2.3
Public utilities 5.5 5.4 6.4 1.4
Street railways 4.2 5.4 8 .9 3. 1
Allothers 5.6 5.4 6.3 0.2
Industrials 6.0 5.9 6.9 2.6
Loss Rate
All industries —0.1 0.0 —1.2 3.5
Railroads 0.5 0.0 —1.0 2.6
Public utilities —0 .2 0.0 —1 .2 4.3
Street railways 1 .3 0.0 —1 .5 2. 1
Allothers —0.3 0.0 —1.1 5.8
Industrials —0.4 0.0 —1.5 3.8
Data, based on Table 183 of Statistical Measures and special supplementary
tabulations, cover large issues in the offerings experience sample, except that
irregu'ar offerings (made during corporate reorganizations, etc.) and issues
outstanding January 1, 1944 are excluded. Outstandings January 1, 1900 are
included. Yields and loss rates are weighted averages with par amounts of
included offerings as weights.
aIncludesissues extinguished before maturity by other contractual methods
as well as by call.LIFE-SPAN PERFORMANCE 91
The utilities occupy a position intermediate between the rails
and industrials with respect to both promised and realized yields.
Utility bonds were offered in volume somewhat later than the
rails but earlier than the industrials, and during a period when
interest rates were rising but still low as compared with the ex-
tremely high levels of the twenties. Hence, the average yield at
which utilities were floated falls between that of the industrials
and rails. Moreover, an unusually large proportion of the par-
amount total of utility bonds was subsequently called and re-
funded at the low interest rates prevailing in the thirties, and a
relatively small proportion went into default. Thus the capital
gains obtained on utility investments were substantial. As Table
13 indicates, the result would have been better except for the very
poor record of street railways. Since some 67 percent of the offer-
ings of that group defaulted, realized yields fell substantially be-
low promised returns, and large losses resulted. When street rail-
ways are excluded from the utility group, the average realized
yield rises and the capital gain rate becomes almost as high as that
for industrials.
One of the surprises of Table 13 is the exceptionally poor per-
formance of the small group of utility bonds (exclusive of street
railways) that defaulted (a realized yield of only 0.2 percent, and a
loss rate of 5.8 percent). These were mainly issues in our group
"electric including other services." The chief offenders were sys-
tems operating street railways as well as generating and distribut-
ing electricity, and pyramided utility holding companies. (For
the experience of the holding companies, cf. Chapter 7.) For most
utilities during the twentieth century earnings were stable or ex-
panding, and fixed charges were well covered, so that little diffi-
culty was encountered in servicing and refunding the debt. How-
ever, for the 9.4 percent of offerings of utility bonds (exclusive of
street railways) that went into default, the salvage value of the
investment appears to have been quite meager, as judged by the
low realized returns and large capital losses.
Table 14, and Chart 3 which is based on it, permit us to take a
closer look at the performance of bonds offered by obligors in the
minor industry divisions. As measured by realized yields and loss
rates, stone, clay, and glass; machinery (except electrical); tobacco;
and mining had the best performance (realized yields of 7.6 per-
cent or above, and capital gains of 1.6 percent or better). Trans-
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TABLE 14—Life-span Yields and Loss
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industries (lumber and furniture) stood at the bottom of the list.
Generally speaking, industries in the group with better than
average realized yields had lower than average default rates and
higher than average call rates; the converse relationships held
for industries with poorer than average realized yields.
TABLE 15—Correlation Coefficients for Calls and Defaults










Based on average experience of minor industry groups, Table 14. All the
above coeflicients are statistically significant; that is, coefficients of this size
or larger would be obtained by chance in less than five out of a hundred
trials if drawn from a population in which the variables were uncorrelated.
The influence of calls and defaults on bond yields and loss
rates has been summarized by means of correlation coefficients in
Table 15, the coefficients measuring the strength of the covaria-
tion between the pairs of variables indicated in the stub and cap-
tion. The coefficients were computed from the data of Table 14,
and thus summarize the relationships among the yield averages
for the various minor industry groups and the corresponding per-
centages of offerings that were called or defaulted.
All of the coefficients in the table are significant in the statistical
sense. As has been indicated, high default rates generally imply
Footnotes to Table 14
Data, based on Tables 212 and 213 of Statistical Measures and special
supplementary tabulations, cover large issues in the offerings experience
sample, except that issues outstanding January 1, 1944 are excluded through-
out, and par amounts of irregular offerings (made during corporate reorgani-
zations, etc.) were excluded before computing the percents called and defaulted.
Outstandings January 1, 1900 are included. Yields and loss rates are weighted
averages with par amounts of included offerings as weights. Yield averages
are based on five or more issues; industry groups omitted because not meeting
this criterion are apparel, construction, and miscellaneous manufacturing.
aIncludesissues extinguished before maturity by other contractual methods
as well as by call.LIFE-SPAN PERFORMANCE 95
low realized yields and high loss rates, while high call rates imply
the reverse.1 So far as interindustry variations are concerned, the
market appears also to have appraised correctly the risks of de-
fault. Despite differences among minor industries in the timing of
flotations and associated differences in basic money rates, the posi-
tive correlation between the yield promised at offering and the per-
cent subsequently defaulting suggests that risk premiums in yield
were on the whole greater, the greater the risk of default. The sig-
nificant negative correlation between the yield promised at offer-
ing and the percent subsequently called is perhaps surprising in
view of the large volume of high-coupon bonds called in the thir-
ties. Since corporate bonds are usually floated near par, high cou-
pon rates usually imply high promised yields at offering. The rea-
son for the negative correlation is the factor of quality, or the size
of the risk premium included in the promised yield. Over the
years, industries with particularly high promised yields (large risk
premiums) generally had higher default rates and lower call rates
than industries with lower promised yields (see also Chapter 5).
IDespitethe statistical significance of the correlation coefficients in Table
15, it would be a mistake to infer that the mere incidence of default and of
call in particular industry groups is sufficient to explain all, or even most, of
the variation in the loss rate. Only about 45 percent of the total interindustry
variation in loss rates is "explained" by the call and default rates jointly (the
square of the multiple correlation coefficient of 0.67 between loss rates, de-
fault rates, and call rates), leaving 55 percent to be explained by industry
differences in the size of call premiums, default losses, etc.
It is of interest to note also that either the default rate or the call rate
taken separately accounts for approximately as much of the total variation in
the loss rate as do the two taken jointly (41 percent for each variable separately
as against 45 percent for the pair). The reason is the extremely high intercor-
relation between default and call rates (—0.85), which is in turn caused by the
fact that interindustry differences in the percent of bonds paid in full at
maturity are quite small, and that this percent plus the percents called and
defaulted exhaust the possibilities for each group (they sum to 100 percent).
The call rate is therefore virtually the complement of the default rate. In
short, a high call rate for an industry group suggests a correspondingly small
loss rate, both because the call premiums are reflected in the realized yields
and because the incidence of default is thereby reduced. Conversely, a high
default rate suggests few calls, and call premiums insufficient to offset default
losses.
A purely logical consequence of the fact that the percentages of offerings ex-
tinguished by call, by payment in full at maturity, and by noncontractual
methods after default sum to 100 percent is that any pair of these variables is
as efficient as any other in explaining the total variation in the loss rate; simi-
larly, the three variables jointly are no more efficient than any pair. (That is
to say, each of the three-variable multiple correlation coefficients is identically
equal to the four-variable coefficient.)96 AGGREGATE EXPERIENCE
By definition, the promised yield, realized yield, and loss rate
are joined in an accounting identity, the loss rate being simply
the algebraic difference between the promised and realized yields.
Thus if the investor is interested in estimating the realized yield
he will receive if he purchases new bonds at offering and holds
them to extinguishment, he must consider the influence of the
promised yield and of the loss rate on the realized yield. If, on the
other hand, he is attempting to set up a loss reserve for corporate
bonds, it would be helpful if he knew whether the promised yield
or the realized yield had the greater influence on the loss rate.
TABLE 16—Correlation Coefficients and Ratios for
Promised Yields, Realized Yields, and Loss Rates over








toss rate +0.43° +0.46° 12.26
Realized yieldand
loss rate —0.96° 1.2
Promised yield and
realized yield —0.10 —0.20 10.06
Based on average experience of minor industry groups, Table 14. For
definitions of the above measures, see any standard statistical text. The
test of significance for the rank coefficients is that given by M. G. Kendall,
S. F. H. Kendall, and B. B. Smith in "The Distribution of Spearman's coeffi-
cient of Rank Correlation in a Universe in Which All Rankings Occur an
Equal Number of Times," Biometrika, Vol. XXX, 1939, PP. 251—73. For a
joint test of the product-moment coefficients and variance ratios for variables
joined by an accounting identity, see Volume of Financing, pp. 82—90.
Coefficknts of this size or larger would be obtained by chance in less than
five out of a hundred trials if drawn from a population in which the variables
were uncorrelated.
bRatioof variance of second variable in stub to first variable. The vari-
ances are: promised yield, 0.445 percent; realized yield, 4.445 percent; and
loss rate, 5.439 percent.
A ratio of this size or larger would be obtained by chance in less than
five out of a hundred trials if drawn from a population in which the variables
had equal variances.
Some evidence bearing on this matter is presented in Table 16,
which shows the correlation coefficients for yields and loss rates
computed from the minor industry averages of Table 14. The
table shows that the market predicted loss rates with some degree
of accuracy but not realized yield (the positive correlation co-LIFE-SPAN PERFORMANCE 97
efficients between promised yield and loss rate are significantly
different from zero, but the negative coefficients between promised
yield and realized yield are too low to be statistically significant).8
The coefficients show high negative correlation of the realized
yield and loss rate, so that whichever of them is considered to be
the dependent variable, it is dominated by the other.
Whenever a variable (such as the loss rate) is defined as the
difference between two variable components (in the present case,
the promised and realized yields), it will necessarily be dominated
by the component with the greater variation, unless the two com-
ponents are highly correlated.9 Since the variance of the realized
yield is ten times that of the promised yield, and the promised
and realized yields are virtually independent of one another, the
loss rate is largely determined by the realized yield. On the as-
sumption of complete independence of components, approxi-
mately ten-elevenths (91 percent) of the variance in loss rates
among minor industry groups may be attributed to the realized
yield and only one-eleventh (9 percent) to the promised yield.'°
It follows that the loss rate is dominated by the realized yield (or
the realized yield by the loss rate). Moreover, since the realized
yield is substantially dependent upon the subsequent call and
default experience of the issues, the loss rate is similarly deter-
mined. These conclusions are rather negative for those who might
attempt to set up loss reserves, given only a knowledge of the
promised yields at offering. Fortunately, as we shall find in later
chapters, other variables more closely related to quality than
promised yields provide better bases for estimating realized yields
and establishing loss reserves.
One further point is of interest in connection with the yield
and default data for the industry groups. From a cursory examina-
tion of the major industry groupings, it might be surmised that
8 absence of a close relationship between contract interest rates on
mortgage loans and realized yields has also been noted by R. J. Saulnier. See
his Introduction to J. E. Morton's Urban Mortgage Lending: Comparative
Markets and Experience (Princeton University Press for the National Bureau
of Economic Research, 1956).
9 See Volume of Financing, pp. 82-90, for a full explanation.
10 Since the sample product-moment correlation coefficient for the promised
and realized yields is only —0.20, roughly the same conclusion is obtained by
calculating "coefficients of determination" or squares of the correlation co-
effidents for the loss rates and realized yields, and for the loss rates and the
promised yields. These are 92 and 21 percent, respectively, the sum exceeding
100 percent because of the low intercorrelation of the component variables.98 AGGREGATE EXPERiENCE
industries that enjoyed the most rapid expansion during the past
half century were the ones having the lowest default and loss rates
and the highest realized yields. The public i:itilities, with the ex-
ception of the street railways, enjoyed an exceptional growth in
output, expanding almost as rapidly as the manufacturing in-
dustries, and both groups on the whole had favorable yield and
loss experience. The street railways, on the other hand, are typical
of a declining industry, and the railroads, of one well past the
stage of most rapid growth; and in both cases the yields and loss
rates were unfavorable.
Comparison of the minor industry data in Table 14 with in-
dexes of output may illuminate the role of economic growth as a
factor in bond safety. Such a comparison requires consolidating
the data in Table 14 to conform as closely as possible with the
basic industry classification of the various available studies of
output.11
Two estimates of output expansion were used for the purpose,
one covering the period 1899—1937, the longest covered by Fabri-
cant's data on output (the major source for our analysis), and the
other the period 1929—37, which spans the Great Depression. The
first period compares most closely with the years covered by our
data; the second was included to test the hypothesis that those
industries that expanded least during the Great Depression, or
contracted most, would have the highest default rates and poorest
yield performance.
Rank correlation coefficients were calculated between net per-
centage changes in physical output and the default rates, loss
rates, and realized yields. In general the results of our experiment
ii The indexes of output are from the following: Solomon Fabricant, The
Output of Manufacturing Industries, 1899—1937 (1940), pp.60—61;Harold
Barger, The Transportation Industries, 1899—1946: A Study of Output, Em-
ployment, and Productivity (1951), pp. 70 and 114; Harold Barger and Sam
H. Schurr, The Mining Industries, 1899—1939: Output, Employment, Pro-
ductivity (1944), p.. 14; Jacob Martin Gould, Output and Productivity in the
Electric and Utilities, 1899—1942 (1946), Pp. 42 and 103, all published b.y
the National Bureau of Economic Research; also Harold Barger, Distribution's
Place in the American Economy since 1869 (1955), p. 22, published by Prince-
ton University Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research. To obtain
comparability of industrial classification, we combined Fabricant's indexes for
the food and beverage groups into one index (roughly corresponding to our
"food" group); similarly our measures of bond experience for the lumber
and furniture groups were combined, as were the groups "automobiles" and
"transportation equipment (except automobiLes)," and electric utilities includ-
ing and excluding other services.LIFE-SPAN PERFORMANCE 99
were inconclusive; although the signs of the coefficients were what
would be expected, their magnitudes were quite low, and none
was significantly different from zero.12 The inference would ap-
pear to be that in a rapidly expanding economy such as ours
(physical output increased by 276 percent between 1899 and 1937,
and by 3 percent even during the Great Depression) fixed charges
on most issues are well covered. Under such conditions there is
little relationship between default experience among minor in-
dustry groups and. the rapidity of industrial growth. For rapidly
growing industries, the actual loss rates observed depended largely
upon the investment quality of the individual issues floated by
the members of the group, i.e. upon their profit margins, cash
flows, and myriads of other factors relating to the risk of default.
Examples are petroleum and coal products, which had the highest
growth rate of any industry in the manufacturing group over the
period 1899—1937, and had a low default rate and loss rate; and
transportation equipment (in Table 14, automobiles plus trans-
portation equipment except automobiles), which had the second
highest growth rate, but a high default rate and loss rate. Greater
regularity is to be observed among industries that suffered sub-
stantial declines in output, such as the street railways and the
forest products group (lumber and furniture in Table 14), and
among industries that were retarded by competition of other
products or services (e.g. the railroads). Most issues of such in-
dustries had low earnings protection, so that default rates and
loss rates were high. But the slow-growing industries were too few
in number in our expanding economy to govern the over-all per-
formance.
12Therank correlation coefficients are as follows:
RANK CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR
NET CHANGES IN PHYSICAL OUTPUT AND
PERIOD Number of
Realized Loss Default Industry
Yield Rate Rate Groups
1899—1937 +0.29 —0.27 —0.33 17
1929—1937 +0.25 —0.22 —0.22 20
In no casewasthe coefficient statistically significant. A furthercheck was made
bycomparing the net changesin physical outputduring 1929-37 withthe de-
fault rates of bonds offered before that were still outstanding in 1932:
issuessubjected to the heavy default risks of the 1930's. That test also failed
to yield significant results.100 AGGREGATE EXPERIENCE
Secular Drifts in the Retrospective
Quality of Bond Offerings
Substantial evidence has been presented in preceding passages to
the effect that realized yields and loss rates calculated from offer-
ing to extinguishment are influenced to a significant extent by
subsequent default experience. It is thus possible to use the per-
cent of the total par amount of offerings that subsequently went
into default as a retrospective measure of the quality of the offer-
ings, and as a check on various prospective measures (agency rat-
ings, market ratings, etc.) to be examined in later chapters. In
this section the default rate and the loss rate are used to investi-
gate the relationship between the year of offering—or more prop-
erly, the speculative temper of the market at the time of offering
—and bond quality in the retrospective sense.
Declines in the retrospective quality of various types of securi-
ties offered in the twenties have been noted by several investiga-
tors: by G. W. Edwards in his analysis of corporate bond issues
outstanding in default in December 1931; by use Mintz in a
study of foreign dollar bonds offered in the domestic market in
the 1920's; and by R. J. Saulnier in an analysis of differences in
foreclosure rates on real estate mortgage loans of life insurance
companies made before and after January 1, 1924.13 Each of these
investigations suggests a definite decline in the quality of invest-
ments originating in the late 1920's.
Data of the same type, but covering the period 1900—1943, are
presented in Table 17 and Chart 4; they indicate the percent of
the par amount of offerings of all straight corporate bonds (uni-
verse estimates) subsequently going into default, classified by
year of origination and by major industry division. Since the
annual data are rather erratic, a five-year moving average has
been passed through them on the chart as a guide to the eye,
five years being chosen for the averages because it is a period
long enough to damp out most of the temporary disturbances,
13 Cf. George W. Edwards, "Control of the Security-Investment System,"
Harvard Business Review) October 1933,p.7; use Mintz, Deterioration in the
Quality of Foreign Bonds Issued in the United States, 1920-1930 (National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1951), p. 39ff.; and R. J. Saulnier, Urban
Mortgage Lending by Life Insurance Companies (National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, Financial Research Program, 1950), Table B 10. See also
Geoffrey H. Moore's "The Quality of Credit in Booms and Depressions,"
Journal of Finance, May 1956, pp. 288-300, for an interesting summary and
discussion o.f these and other relevant studies.LIFE-SPAN PERFORMANCE 101
but not so long as to introduce spurious long cycles in the data.
These materials, like those of other investigators, reveal a defi-
nite decline in the quality of corporate bonds offered in the late
twenties, for all industries combined, and for each of the major
components. At the same time, Chart 4 reveals a point not noted





























































































































































































1935 6.6% 10,4% 0.4% 16.2%
1936 2.9 3.0 3.2 2.1
1937 0.3 0.0 0.7 0.0
1938 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1939 0.5 0.0 0.9 0.0
1940 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.0
1941 1.0 11.5 0.0 0.0
1942 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1943 1.6 10.9 0.0 0.0
Trough years 24.3 32.0 21.9 23.2
Peak years 24.9 30.8 23.3 22.6
Contraction
and trough
years 24.1 33.2 20.6 24.6
,
Expansion and
peakyears 22.0 27.5 20.9 18.0
Based on Table 130 of Statistical Measures: par-amount data for all large
(straight) corporate issues, and for 10 percent of small issues adjusted to
universe totals, after removal in each case of amounts for which information
was lacking on default status. Readers interested in computing weighted
average default rates for combinations of years should consult Table 130.
Peak and trough years are from the National Bureau's business cycle chro-
nology; cf. Arthur F. Burns and Wesley C. Mitchell, Measuring Business
Cycles (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1946) p. 78.
previously: that default rates even higher than those in the late
twenties were experienced on bonds floated during the first fifteen
years of the century.'4 Viewed in full perspective, the period of
the late twenties and early thirties appears as simply a sharp
break in a falling trend in default and loss rates.
Supplementary evidence on the deterioration of bond quality
in the twenties is presented in Table 18, which contains loss rates
on the large and small issues included in the offerings experi-
ence sample classified by year of offering, and the corresponding
14 Actually, rail bonds offered in the twenties did worse than those offered
in the first decade and a ha'f, but utility bonds offered in the early period
(mostly street railways) did very badly. There is little to choose from as be-
tween industrial bonds offered before 1916 and in the twenties.LIFE-SPAN PERFORMANCE
CHART 4—Proportion of Offerings,
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Data cover all straight corporate issues. Default rates are from Table 17, based on
par-amount data; net changes and gross new-money offerings are from "Volume of
Financing,' Tables A-2 and A-12, respectively. Broken lines are centered five-year











default rates. As the table shows, investors actually received more
than was promised at offering in the early twenties, but less than
the amount promised in the later years. The loss rates were par-
ticularly high for large issues in 1928—29, averaging 1.7 percent,
and for small issues in 1927—29, averaging 3.3 percent. Loss rates
and default rates for small issues were generally higher and more
erratic than for large issues.
The rising default and loss rates of the twenties must not be
accepted as conclusive evidence of quality deterioration through-
out that period without further investigation. The principal
difficulty with the default rates as calculated is that the rates for
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extinguishedbefore the Great Depression and not subject to the
financial stresses of the later era. On purely a priori grounds one
would expect the default rates to rise whenever the year of offer-
ing approaches a period of heavy defaults. To eliminate this
possible bias, supplementary default rates are presented, which
include only the group of bonds still outstanding on January 1,
1930 (Table 19). If anything, such rates are biased in the oppo-
site direction, since certain issues that, by reason of their high
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automaticallyexcluded. The fact that the adjusted rates remain
higher toward the end of the decade than at the beginning would
seem to provide conclusive evidence of a definite decline in the
quality of corporate bonds offered in the twentiesas measured
by their subsequent performance. This decline iseven more
striking when seen in temporal perspective,as a counter move-
ment in the long trend of improvement in bond quality over the
full period studied (Chart 4). For example,on the average, bonds
offered during the first decade of the century,many years prior
to the test period of the thirties, had even higher defaultrates,
unadjusted, than the adjusted rates for bonds offered in the late
twenties.
-1.0
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TABLE 18—Life-span Loss Rates and Default Rates on Bonds
Offered 1920—29
LOSSRATES DEFAULTRATES









1920 —1.0% 1.6% 13.1% 31.5%
1921 —0.4 —1.7 12.2 17.1
1922 0.1 0.5 12.3 23.5
1923 —0.4 —0.4 8.3 23.6
1924 —0.2 0.5 19.2 29.4
1925 0.3 —0.4 19.2 15.8
1926 0.2 1.5 17.8 35.0
1927 0.8 3.4 19.2 61.7
1928 1.1 3.2 34.6 59.5
1929 2.6 3.3 33.3 36.5
1920—24 —0.3 0.0 13.0 25.0
1925—29 0.9 2.3 24.8 41.7
1920—29 0.4 1.2 18.9 33.4
Loss rates, from special tabulations covering issues in the offerings experience
sample, are weighted averages with par amounts of included offerings as
weights. For issues still outstanding on January 1, 1944 liquidation is assumed
at prices prevailing in the first quarter of that year. Default rates are based
on Tables 130 and 131 of Statistical Measures: par-amount data for all large
(straight) corporate issues, and for 10 percent of small issues.
TABLE 19—Percent of Par Amount of Bonds Offered 1920—29










1920 2.1% 0.0% 2.0%
1921 14.0 28.6 15,8
1922 10.2 29.5 13.2
1923 6.0 16.6 8.3
1924 30.2 31.9 30.3
1925 17.7 19.1 18.0
1926 17.5 48.3 25,9
1927 19.6 52.7 25.2 •
1928 39.7 54.8 43.0
1929 36.9 36.5 36.8
From special tabulations of the National Bureau of Economic Research,
covering all large (straight) corporate issues and 10 percent of small. When
large and small are combined, the latter are adjusted to the universe of bonds
in good standing on January 1, 1930. For issues having more than one offering,
the total par amount was assigned arbitrarily to the year in which the issue
was first taken up by the investing public.108 AGGREGATE EXPERIENCE
It is interesting to speculate upon the significance of the long
swings that seem to have dominated the default rates on corpo-
rate bonds, the extremely high levels of the first fifteen years of
the century, the lows during the early twenties, the upward rise
until 1934, and the subsequent sharp decline. Since our records
terminate on January 1, 1944, the default rates toward the close
of the period do not reflect defaults after that date on issues then
outstanding. Nevertheless, in view of the substantial proportion
of bonds offered during the thirties that have already been re-
tired, and the excellent record of corporate bonds generally since
World War II, there seems little doubt that the full record, when
it becomes available, will show a sharp dip in default rates for
bonds offered during the late 1930's.
'The rise in the default rates during the twenties and the sub-
sequent decline appear to fit in well with the finding of Burns
and Mitchell as to the growing instability of the financial series
they examined between severe depressions. Between long-period
minima, tentatively dated by Burns and Mitchell at June 1894,
June 1908, September 1921, and March 1933, they found a strik-
ing dissimilarity in the behavior of series relating to industrial
activity from those pertaining to interest rates and speculation.
For example, while the average rise in the specific cycle ampli-
tudes of the industrial series was largest for the group of specific
cycles immediately following a severe depression, and smallest
for the group of specific cycles immediately prior to the next
severe depression, the reverse was true for bond yields, call money
rates, and shares traded.
To Burns and Mitchell this suggested the tentative hypothesis
of continuous deterioration in financial behavior between major
depressions. In their words: "After a severe depression industrial
activity rebounds sharply, but speculation does not. The follow-
ing contraction in business is mild, which leads people to be less
cautious. Consequently, in the next two or three cycles, while
the cyclical advances become progressively smaller in industrial
activity, they become progressively larger in speculative activity.
Finally, the speculative boom collapses and a drastic liquidation
follows, which ends this cycle of cycles and brings us back to the
starting point."
Lacking suitable monthly or quarterly data, we cannot accu-
15ArthurF. Burns and Wesley C. Mitchell, Mea.suring Business Cycles
(National Bureau of Economic Research, 1946), p. 460.LIFE-SPAN PERFORMANCE 109
rately date specific cycles in corporate defaults by period of origi-
nation nor analyze their changing amplitudes between dates of
severe depressions. Nevertheless, the long swings in the data do
provide some evidence of deteriorating credit conditions toward
the end of "major cycles," and of a possible tightening up of credit
standards near the beginning of new major cycles. Thus Burns
and Mitchell tentatively place a trough of a major cycle in June
1908 and we can detect a corresponding dip in default rates on
bonds offered around that time. (Because of the erratic nature
of the data the best that can be done, however, is to place the
turning point for rails in the years 1908—10, for utilities in the
years 1910—12, and for industrials in the years 1908—10.) Default
rates generally began to rise after that up to the outbreak of
World War I, and then turned downward, possibly because of the
credit restraint program of the Capital Issues Committee. De-
fault rates quite generally reached troughs around 1921 (1919—22
for the rails, 1919—25 for the utilities, but perhaps even earlier for
the industrials), and 1921is the year assigned by Burns and
Mitchell as the date of the next major depression. The series
then all turned upward, reaching peaks around 1928 or 1929.
Some evidence as to one possible cause of the long swings in
bond quality is presented in the lower part of Chart 4, which
shows the net volume of bond financing and the volume of gross
new-money offerings for all industries and for the major indus-
try groups. (Gross new-money offerings are equal to total offerings
less refundings.) It will be observed that the trends in default
rates are roughly comparable with trends in net and gross new
financing, default rates tending to be high on securities issued
during years of high financial volume and vice versa, with the
default rates lagging behind the other series. This would seem
to suggest that some issues, perhaps those of marginal quality,
can find a ready market only when the market is buoyant, and
that in periods of market pessimism only the top grade issues
can be placed, a conjecture not incompatible with the Burns
and Mitchell thesis of financial deterioration between major
cycles. On the other hand, the timing of the upper and lower
turning points in the long swings of the default and volume series
does not correspond so closely as one could wish (note particularly
the rise in the volume of bond financing for all industries begin-
fling in 1919, and the fall in 1928). Moreover, it might be ex-
pected that if the quality of credit deteriorates between major110 AGGREGATE EXPERiENCE
depressions, the same phenomenon would be observed, although
perhaps to a lesser degree, within the shorter swings defining busi-
ness cycles. Yet conformity indexes for the default rates show no
evidence of sensitivity to business cycles as defined by the National
Bureau.'6 At the same time, the longer swings in default rates do
not appear to be entirely unrelated to the major cycles of the past
nor to the long-run movements observable in the net volume of
bond financing. The evidence, while hardly conclusive, seems suffi-
ciently strong to suggest a need for possible review of present
credit standards, particularly in view of the abrupt run-up in
corporate bonded debt since World War IL
DEFAULTED BONDS: PERFORMANCE UP TO AND AFTER DEFAULT
Of the $71.5 billion par amount of straight corporate bonds of-
fered in 1900-1943, $14.6 billion or 20.4 percent are known to
have defaulted in that period, with modest to substantial losses
to investors. This section examines in somewhat greater detail
than previously the realized returns obtained on defaulted issues
per se, and the extent of the losses suffered. A principal objective
is to test the policy. imposed by statutory rules and regulatory
bodies upon many investment institutions during the thirties
of selling bonds promptly at default or of writing them down to
market. For that purpose, realized yields were computed for the
following periods in the life of defaulted issues: offering to ex-
tinguishment, offering to default, default to extinguishment, de-
fault to two and to five years later, and, for successor securities,
from extinguishment of the original issue to five years later
(Table 20). Comparison of the results with norms judged as rea-
sonable by the investor will test the wisdom of selling at default,
16Conformityindexes for the percent of the par amount of corporate bonds
subsequently going into default by year of offering are presented below for
the ten cycles 1900-1938:
ExpansionContractionFull Cycle
All industries —20 +20
Railroads +20 —40 —16
Public utilities 0 +40 +16
Industrials 0 0 —16
An index of +100 indicates perfect positive conformity, and an index of
—100 perfect negative conformity, The indexes presented here have not been
adjusted for possible leads and lags in the data at reference.cycle turning
points, but are so low as to suggest, nevertheless, negligible conformity with
business cycles.DEFAULTED BONDS 111
and, for those with a speculative bent, of purchasing defaulted
bonds or their successors.
Since the purpose is to reveal variations in experience as be-
tween different natural periods up to and after the default of an
issue, information on defaulted bonds has been handled issue by
issue, without regard to separate offerings if such there were. That
is to say, yields from offering to default and from offering to ex-
tinguishment cover only the first offering (the principal offering
for most issues); yields from default to two and to five years later,
of course, cover the experience of the entire issue. As Chapter 1
indicates, yields from offering to default and from offering to
extinguishment were computed at compound interest, while other
yields covering shorter natural periods after default were com-
puted at simple interest. Because of the difficulty of obtaining
offering prices, it was not possible to compute quite as many
yields from offering to default and to extinguishment as yields
from default to extinguishment; hence Table 20 always specifies
the number of issues included. Yields from default to two and
to five years later were computed only for the smaller number of
issues still outstanding at the end of those periods; similarly, yields
from extinguishment to five years later could be computed only
for defaulted issues extinguished by exchange for successor secu-
rities. To avoid the problem of shifting par-amount weights be-
tween dates of offering and default, the statistics on yield experi-
ence of defaulted issues are presented as simple unweighted
averages.
Comparison of the results for the various industry-size break-
downs in Table 20 indicates that for each group substantial losses
were suffered by investors who liquidated at default as compared
with those who held to extinguishment; for all except the rail
bonds, realized yields were actually negative on bonds sold at
default. With the advantage of hindsight, it now appears that the
practice of selling at default was quite costly to institutional in-
vestors, and that the legal rules and regulatory directives encour-
aging that practice were unnecessarily harsh. Although capital
losses were substantial on defaulted bonds even when held to
extinguishment, in that case they were lower by 50 percent or
more for each of the industry-size groups (except small indus-
trials, 40 percent) than the comparable rates from offering to
default. Moreover, the realized returns obtained from offering
to extinguishment on all large and all small issues were positive,112 AGGREGATE EXPERIENCE
TABLE 20—Yields and Loss Rates up to Default, over Selected
Periods after Default, and over Life Span of Issues
Defaulting 1900—1943
NumberPromised
PERIOD of Yield atRealizedLoss
IssuesOffering Yield Rate
Large Issues, All Industries
First offering to extinguishmenta 549 6.4% 2.3% 4.1%
Offering to default 549 6.4 —3.4 9.8
Default to 2 years later 368 7.3
Default to 5 years later 215 5.3
Default to extinguishmenta 581 20.0
Successors, for 5 years 341 20.3
Large, Railroads
First offering to extinguishmenta 234 6. 1 3.3 2.8
Offering to default 234 6. 1 0.1 6.0
Default to 2 years later 173 0.5
Default to 5 years later 134 1 .1
Default to extinguishrnenta 247 18.6
Successors, for 5 years 114 23 .1
Large, Public Utilities
First offering to extinguishmenta 171 6.4 1.7 4.7
Offeringtodefault 171 6.4 11.3
Default to 2 years later 108 0.9
Default to 5 years later 50 5.8
Default to 182 17.0
Successors, for S years 119 18.7
Large, Industrials
First offering to extinguishmento 144 6.9 1 .4 5.5
Offering to default 144 6.9 —7.5 14.4
Default to 2 years later 87 30. 7
Default to 5 years later 31 22.5
Default to extinguishmenta 152 25.8
Successors, for 5 years 108 19.2
and do not compare too unfavorably with the promised yields
on government securities outstanding during the thirties and
forties, the years when corporate defaults were heaviest.
As the table shows, the reason for the better performance of
defaulted bonds held to extinguishment than of those sold at
default was the extremely high rate of return obtained after the
date of default (note, for example, the realized return of 20.0
percent per annum obtained on the large issues when purchased




PERIOD of Yield atRealizedLoss
Issues Offering Yield Rate
Small Issues,All Industries
First offering to extinguishmenta 119 7.8% 2 .4%5.4%
Offering to default 119 7.8 —4.0 11.8
Default to 2 years later 62 —1 .2
Default to 5 years later 37 11 .6
Default to 137 26.7
Successors, for 5 years 61 20.9
Small, Railroads
First offering to extinguishmenta 17 5.2 4.2 1.0
Offering to default 17 5.2 1.6 3.6
Default to 2 years later 12 —4.0
Default to 5 years later 8 7.5
Default to extinguishmenta 23 8,6
Successors, for 5 years 11 7. 1
Small, Public Utilities
First offering to extinguishmenta 48 6.8 3.6 3.2
Offering to default 48 6.8 —5.0 11.8
Default to 2 years later 23 3.9
Default to 5 years later 15 20.3
Default to extinguishmenta 59 31.3
Successors, for 5 years 30 21.2
Small, Industrials
First offering to extinguishmenta 54 9.6 0.9 8.7
Offering to default 54 9.6 —4.9 14.5
Default to 2 years later 27 —4.4
Default to 5 years later 14 4. 7
Default to extinguishmenta 55 29.5
Successors, for 5 years 20 27.9
From Statistical Measures, Tables 217 and 218 (total columns) and special
supplementary tabulations, covering issues in the default experience sample.
Yields and loss rates are unweighted averages.
°Forissues still outstanding on January 1, 1944 liquidation is assumed at
prices prevailing in the first quarter of that year.
of 26.7 percent on the small issues). In addition, returns obtained
on the successor securities were quite attractive. The evidence
is mixed only for securities held from default to two and to five
years later. Clearly it would have paid to hold bonds of the smaller
issues for the longer period (note the improvement in the realized
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rate of return in each of the industry groups). But the opposite
pattern obtained for large issues of the combined industries, where
the return from assumed sale at the end of two years was higher
than for the five-year period. The high average realized yield
from default to two years later for large issues is dominated by
the extremely high rates of return obtained on a few industrial
issues that were not outstanding five years after default. When
only issues are considered for which both yields could be com-
puted, i.e. issues outstanding five years or more, the average real-
ized yield for total large issues rises from 1.2 percent for the
period from default to two years later to 5.4 percent from default
to five years later. We conclude that the practice of selling bonds
at default was costly during the period covered by our records,
and that the yield experience generally improved, the longer the
issue was held after default.
Corporate Bond Defaults before and during the Great Depression
Table 21 is similar to Table 20 in that it provides data on the
yield experience of defaulted issues held over various natural
periods, but is different in that it contains a breakdown of issues
defaulting before and after January 1, 1930. The purpose is to
determine whether the tendency, previously observed, for the
realized yields to increase with the length of the investment
period measured from date of default was simply a characteristic
of the peculiar market conditions of the 1930's, or whether it
prevailed in earlier periods as well.
The table reveals, first, that the levels of realized rates of return
after default were typically higher for issues defaulting after 1929
than for those defaulting earlier. For the large issues, this was
true of fourteen of the sixteen yield comparisons that can be
made in the table, the only exceptions being rails held from
default to two years later, and industrial successors purchased at
extinguishment. The same general pattern characterizes the small
issues as well, average realized yields on defaults after 1929 ex-
ceeding those of the earlier period in twelve of the sixteen com-
parisons. Yields on successors of small industrial issues, however,
were again somewhat lower in the later period, as were yields on
the various groups of defaulted rail issues after default. Despite
these exceptions, the general pattern is quite pronounced, in-
dicating that realized yields were definitely higher on defaulted
bonds purchased during the Great Depression. In part, the ex-DEFAULTED BONDS 115
planation is the extremely depressed prices of defaulted bonds
in the thirties, the result of the forced liquidation by institutional
investors; in part, the generous payouts and rapid price recovery
in the late thirties and forties. It is worth noting that the low
bond prices at default in the thirties, which resulted in the sub-
sequent high yields, reflect a reverse type of cyclical error to
the high prices (and high default rate) of bonds offered during
the boom of the late twenties.
A second point of interest in connection with Table 21 is the
regularity with which the yields on defaulted bonds improved
with the length of the period that they were held after default.
In each of the two subperiods, 1900—1929 and 1930—43, realized
yields were generally higher for issues held for five years after de-
fault than for those held only two years and were higher still for
issues held until extinguishment. So far as the two- and five-year
periods are concerned, the pattern was most pronounced for the
small issues, and failed to appear in Table 21 only for large rail-
roads defaulting in 1900—1929 and for large industrials defaulting
in 1930—43. In those cases, however, the explanation is that the
averages do not cover an identical sample of issues. When only
issues outstanding for at least five years after default are consid-
ered, the average realized yield for large rails defaulting 1900—1 929
increases from .—3.4 percent for liquidation at the end of two
years to —1.6 percent for liquidation at the end of five years, and
the comparable yield for large industrials defaulting 1930—43 in-
creases from 18.1 percent to 25.2 percent. Many issues outstanding
for less than five years after default were situations in which
prompt settlement could be anticipated at the end of two years
(i.e. settlement within three to five years after default), so that
the price appreciation and yield realized from default to two years
later was large. The yield averages of Table 21 for large rail de-
faults 1900—1929 and for large industrial defaults 1930—43 were
most affected, since rail and industrial defaults in those periods
were settled quickly.17 Realized yields from default to extinguish-
ment were higher than from default to five years later for every
group but one—small rails defaulting 1900—1929, where the yield
averages are unreliable because of the small number of issues
included and the special circumstances involved in a multiple
default of a single issue.
17Forinformation on the speed of settlement in the major industry groups
over selected periods, see Volume of Financing, pp. 210 if.116 AGGREGATE EXPERIENCE
TABLE 21—Realized Yields before Default, over Selected
Periods after Default, and over Life Span of Issues
Defaulting before and after January 1, 1930
DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT TO EX-
TO 2 YRS. TO 5 YRS. TINGUISHMENTa
Number Real- Number Real- Number Real-
of ized of ized of ized
IssuesYieldIssuesYieklissuesYield
Defaulted 1900—1929
Large Issues, all industries110—3.3%52—2.2%187 6.4%
Railroads 47 0.7 25—2.4 80 6.4
Public utilities 47—6.8 24—2.0 63 6.2
Industrials 16—4.9 3 44 6.7
Small Issues, all industries18—9.3 10 8.6 32 13.6
Railroads 4 12.6b 224.5b 7 12.1
Public utilities 11—12.3 7 7.7 17 10.6
Industrials 3 1 821.3
Defaulted .1930—43
Large Issues,allindustries258 11.9 163 7.7 39426.4
Railroads 126—0.9 109 1.9 16724.4
Public utilities 61 6.9 26 12.9 11922.7
Industrials 7138.8 2825.2 10833.6
Small Issues, all industries44 2. 1 27 12.7 105 30. 7
Railroads 8—12.3 6 1.8 16 7.0
Public utilities 12 18.7 831.3 4239.6
Industrials 24—1.5 13 6.3 4730.8
So far as concerns the yield performance of defaulted bonds
purchased at offering, it appears that on the whole the railroads
turned in the best performance in each of the two subperiods
while the industrials turned in the worst. Utility defaults had
a better record than industrials in the early period, but industrials
were slightly better in the thirties, except for small issues held to
extinguishment. Tables in Statistical Measures show that the
superior performance of the railroads from offering to default
and from offering to extinguishment arose from the fact that they
appeared earlier than the utilities and industrials and had a
longer period of uninterrupted coupon payments before default
occurred. In the early period the utilities behaved similarly and
on the average were outstanding before default for about the
same number of years as the rails, but industrials, which had the




MENT FIRST OFFERING TO EXTIN-
TO 5 YRS. TO DEFAULT GUISHMENr
Number Real- Number Real-Number Real-
of ized of ized of ized
IssuesYieldIssuesYieldIssuesYield
Defaulted 1900—1929
Large Issues, all industries11713.7%168—1.7%168 2.3%
Railroads 55 8.2 74 0.8 74 2.6
Public utilities 33 5.8 56 —0. 1 56 2.9
Industrials 2933.2 38—8.7 38 0.8
Small Issuesall industries14 13.1 26—2.3 26 2.9
Railroads 5 6.6 5 1.1 5 6.7
Public utilities 7 12.6 13—0.6 13 4.1
Industrials 2 30.7b 8—7.3 8—1.5
Defaulted 1930—43
Large Issues, all industries22423.8 381—4.3 381 2.3
Railroads 5936.9 160—0.3 160 3.6
Public utilities 8623.6 115—7.2 115 1.0
Industrials 79 14.1 106—7 .0 106 1 .7
Small Issues, all industries47 23 .2 93—4.5 93 2 .3
Railroads 6 7.5 12 1.8 12 3.1
Public utilities 2323.8 35—6.7 35 3.4
Industrials 1827.6 46—4.4 46 1.3
From Statistical Measures, Table 218 (total column) and special supple-
mentary tabulations, covering issues in the default experience sample. Yields
are unweighted averages.
aForissues still outstanding on January 1, 1944 liquidation is assumed at
prices prevailing in the first quarter of that year.
bNotethat the average is based on less than five issues.
Discounted Values of Receipts on Defaulted Issues
The preceding section noted the extremely liberal returns ob-
tained by investors who purchased bonds at default and held to
extinguishment. The high rates of return thus obtained were the
resultant of two factors: (1) the depressed market prices of de-
faulted bonds at the date of default and (2) the liberal payouts
and market appreciation on these securities and their successors.118 AGGREGATE EXPERIENCE
We shall now attempt to disentangle the effects of these two fac-
tors by considering the "present value" on date of default of all
subsequent receipts of interest and principal up to the date of
cash liquidation, or up to five years after extinguishment in the
case of securities exchanged for successors. Liquidation of the
successor securities by sale in the open market five years after
the extinguishment of the original issue was assumed, in the event
that the successors had not already been liquidated for cash. Sale
in the market was also assumed for securities still outstanding at
the end of the period studied (January 1, 1944).
In computing the discounted values (Table 22) two different
rates of discount were used, 3 percent and 6 percent, with interest
in each case compounded semiannually. The use of two discount
rates makes it possible for the analyst to obtain rough estimates
of discounted values by interpolation or extrapolation for other
values that he might wish to take as normal. For example, the
nine-point spread shown in the table between the present value
of receipts on large industrial issues discounted at 3 percent (62)
and at 6 percent (53) suggests a price decrement of about three
points per one point increase in the discount rate (an implied
present value of about 65 at 2 percent, 59 at 4 percent, etc.).18
The difference between the average market prices at default
and p.ar (100) provides a measure of the lump-sum capital loss on
bonds sold at while the difference between the price
at default and the discounted value at 3 or at 6 percent gives an
estimate of the lump-sum capital gain or loss (at the assumed rate
of discount) for bonds purchased at default. As the table indicates,
lump-sum capital losses on bonds sold at default were extremely
large in each industry-size group, averaging for the full period
18Ifa small payment is made on a defaulted bond that was previously con-
sidered as worthless by the market, the "purchaser" will receive an infinitely
large rate of return. From this fact it is evident that the discounted value
at default must decline at a decreasing rate as the assumed discount rate in-
creases. Thus linear interpolation of present values between those presented in
the table at S and at 6 percent provides very rough results.
19Conceptually,a better measure of the lump-sum capital loss on issues
sold at default would be the book value (cf. Chapter 1 and Table 9). Under
present accounting practices, however, the difference between par and book
is seldom very large for corporate bonds up to the date of default, so that it was
not felt worth while to provide separate estimates for book values. It will be
observed further that the capital losses indicated at default will be incurred
only for issues liquidated or written down to market at that time and then
only where suitable loss reserves had not been provided.DEFAULTED BONDS 119
TABLE 22—Market Prices at Default, and Discounted Values
of Receipts after Default, for Issues Defaulting before


















Largelssues,allindustries581 43 63 53 20 10
Railroads 247 44 64 52 20 8
Public utilities 182 45 65 55 20 10
Industrials 152 38 62 53 24 15
Smalllssues,allindustries137 40 63 54 23 14
Railroads 23 56 69 59 13 3
Public utilities 59 43 75 65 32 22
Industrials 55 29 47 41 18 12
Defaulted 1900—1929
Largelssues,allindustries187 61 71 59 10 —2
Railroads 80 65 75 62 10 —3
Public utilities 63 60 72 59 12 —1
Industrials 44 56 62 53 6 —3
Smalllssues,allindustries32 56 79 67 23 11
Railroads 7 64 94 77 30 13
Public utilities 17 60 86 73 26 13
Industrials 8 42 50 45 8 3
Defaulted 1930—43
Large Issues,allindustries394 34 60 50 26 15
Railroads 167 34 58 48 24 14
Public utilities 119 37 61 53 24 16
Industrials 108 30 62 52 32 22
Smalllssues,allindustries105 35 58 50 23 15
Railroads 16 52 58 51 6 —1
Public utilities 42 37 71 61 34 24
Industrials 47 27 46 40 19 13
From Statistical Measures, Table 218 (total column) and special supple-
mentary tabulations, covering issues in the default experience sample. Receipts
include liquidating values of securities still outstanding on January 1, 1944
at prices prevailing in the first quarter of that year. Prices and discounted
values are unweighted averages.120 AGGREGATE EXPERIENCE
1900—1943, 57 points for the large issues and 60 points for the
small. However, comparison of the market prices ruling at default
with the discounted values of subsequent receipts (using any dis-
count rate that might seem reasonable for the purpose) reveals
that such losses could usually have been pared considerably by
holding to extinguishment. From the opposite point of view, there
was a tendency for market prices to be depressed at default, so
that substantial capital gains were obtained by purchase on the
date of default and retention to extinguishment (for the large
issues, 20 points at 3 percent and 10 points at 6 percent; for the
small issues, 23 points and 14 points).
One is particularly impressed by the uniformity of the levels
of discounted values of receipts on large defaulted issues for the
full period 1900—1943. This uniformity shows in particular that
the large industrial issues, which had a lower average market
price at default than the rails and utilities, were relatively under-
valued by the market, so that subsequent capital gains were un-
usually large (see also Table 21). The recovery value and default
price of the small issues averaged about the same as on large
issues, but there was less uniformity among the industry groups.
Small rail issues sold at somewhat higher prices than other issues,
large or small, since many of them were underlying divisional
obligations of larger systems well secured as to lien position.
Perhaps for the same reason, the discounted value of subsequent
receipts on the small rails was good, but not as remarkable as
that of the small utilities. Among the six industry-size groups
covered for the period 1900—1943, the small industrials had the
poorest record as measured both by the price at default and the
discounted value of subsequent receipts. But since small indus-
trials, like other issues, were undervalued at default, subsequent
capital gains were substantial.
Comparison of the records of corporate bond defaults prior to
and during the Great Depression reveals that prices at default
were consistently lower in the later period for each of the indus-
try-size groups. Discounted values at 3 and 6 percent were also
substantially lower in the later period (except for large industrials,
where the discounted values for the two periods were practically
the same), partially because prices of defaulted bonds and their
successors still outstanding on January 1, 1944 had not yet fully
recovered from the depression lows. But the differentials between
receipts and market prices at default were larger, with the resultCHRONOLOGICAL PERIODS 121
that capital gains on bonds purchased at default in the thirties
were generally extremely high.
Again we note a rough comparability between the experience
on small and on large issues within the two subperiods shown
in Table 22, although the subsequent pay-outs on small issues
defaulting in 1900—1929 were substantially higher than on the
large. The reason was the exceptionally good recovery of small
rail and utility issues, which more than offset the poor perform-
ance of small industrials. In the later period also, the small in-
dustrials did poorly, both as compared with other small issues
and with large industrials. In both periods covered, small rails
and utilities performed better than the comparable classes of
large issues.
In summary, it would appear from the materials of this and
the preceding section that corporate bonds were usually under-
valued at default, and particularly in the 1930's. Capital losses
on issues sold at that time were excessive, and subsequent recov-
eries were substantial.
OVER-ALL PERFORMANCE IN DIFFERENT
CHRONOLOGICAL PERIODS
Weighted average yields and loss rates, and distributions of out-
standings by default status and method of extinguishment, are
presented in Table 23 for all issues in the periodic experience
sample that were outstanding at the beginning of selected chron-
ological periods. It will be recalled from Chapter 1 that only issues
in good standing at the beginning of a period for which realized
yields could be computed are in the periodic experience sample.
The table covers all eleven four-year periods, 1900—1903, 1904—07,
and so on, and nine longer periods. The yields for individual is-
sues on which the averages are based were computed on the
assumption that an investor purchased at the beginning and sold
at the end of the periods indicated; since the averages were com-
puted by weighting each individual yield by the corresponding
par amount of the issue outstanding at the beginning of the pe-
riod, they are applicable to an investor who diversified his invest-
ments between issues in rough proportion to size. To avoid in so
far as possible the problem of an assumed reinvestment rate, issues
maturing during the period were excluded; the yields should be



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A glance at the table will illustrate the wide range of experi-
ence obtained on bond portfolios held over different periods dur-
ing the past half century. Although the average levels of prom-
ised yields to maturity at the beginning of the periods differed
rather markedly and erratically from the yields promised on the
very best bonds outstanding at the time in the market (cf. Table
7), the trends were substantially the same. Thus the promised
yields for the large and small issues were low at the beginning
of the century, when basic yields were low, and were high in 1920
and 1932, when basic yields were high. In general, the weighted
average promised yields of the major industry-size components
followed the same pattern. The principal exception occurred in
1940, when large utility and industrial issues were selling at their
top prices of the century while rail bonds sold at near lows. Rail
earnings in 1940 had as yet shown little recovery from the de-
pressed levels of the 1930's; and rail bonds, which were outstand-
ing in large amounts, dominated the totals for all issues. It is
worth noting also that small industrial concerns had not fully
recovered by 1940, and that the yields on the outstanding obliga-
tions of that group were still very high (10.4 percent).
Roughly speaking, the realized yields over different four-year
periods of investment conformed to the pattern of promised yields
at the beginning of the four-year periods. Thus realized yields
were particularly high for the periods 1932—35, 1920—23 and 1924—
27, since bonds were selling at bargain prices (high promised
yields) at the beginning of each of those periods. Moreover, the
realized yields for the major industry and size components show
a high degree of conformity to the over-all averages for most
periods covered. Realized yields over the period 1932—35 were the
highest of any of the four-year periods for the utilities and indus-
trials and were the second highest for the large rails. The highest
returns on large rail bonds were obtained over the period 1940—43,
when rail earnings snapped back with the wartime expansion
in general business activity (an average realized rate of return
of 12J percent). On the other hand, realized returns were excep-
tionally low for most groups during the periods of financial col-
lapse, 1928—31, and 1916—19. In the 1928—31 debacle, the over-all
average return was negative (—0.9 percent for all large issues, and
—1.3 for all small). It is noteworthy that the worst performers
in that period were the small industrials (realized yield, —6.2
percent), followed by the large rails (—2.8 percent) and the smallCHRONOLOGICAL PERIODS 131
rails (—1.4 percent). Over the same period the utilities had the
best record (a realized yield of 1.0 percent for large utilities and
0.9 percent for small). In this worst period large industrial issues
yielded virtually a zero rate of return (0.1 percent). The only other
comparable period was 1936—39, when the realized return on large
rail issues was —2.5 percent. Evidence as to the resiliency of the
bond market is provided by the realized yields for the longer
periods, which were always positive, and even in the period of
greatest stress, 1928—39, did not drop below 3.1 percent for all
large issues and 3.9 percent for all small. Comparably low returns
were obtained only in the periods 1900—1907, and 1900—1919, when
interest rates were rising and capital losses were substantial. Even
so, realized returns did not drop below 3.3 percent for the large
issues and 3.8 for the small.
The Impact of Genera( Market Conditions
on Average Yields and Loss Rates
In the discussion of yields and loss rates calculated from offering
to extinguishment, it was observed that the average yield promised
at offering frequently had little bearing upon the yield actually
realized to extinguishment, because default status and method
of extinguishment play so important a role in the determination
of the realized rate of return over certain long periods (large de-
fault rates causing low realized yields and high loss rates, and
large call rates causing the opposite behavior). On purely a priori
grounds we should expect the situation to be quite different in
the case of yields and loss rates calculated over short chronological
periods. And as a matter of fact, during most of the four-year pe-
riods covered by our records, the proportion of the total par amount
of bonds going into default or extinguished by call was indeed
small as compared with the proportion in good standing through-
out the period. It follows that the rates of return to investors over
short periods were usually governed by the condition of the capi-
tal market on the assumed dates of purchase and sale, falling
promised yields over a period (rising prices) implying high real-
ized returns and low loss rates, and rising promised yields im-
plying a reverse pattern of behavior. It was only for the assumed
investment periods of the thirties that default and call rates played
a significant role, and even then the effects of market conditions
at the terminal dates are clearly apparent in the yield averages.
One method of detecting the influence of capital market condi-132 AGGREGATE EXPERIENCE
tions on trading profits in corporate bonds is to compare the di-
rections of change in the average promised yields over the periods
with the signs of the loss rates. Other things equal, a rise in average
promised yield (or a fall in bond prices) implies a positive loss
rate (less received than promised); conversely, a fall in average
promised yield implies a negative loss rate (more received than
promised). The evidence is summarized in Table 24, which shows
TABLE 24—Number of Times That the Loss Rate and the
Change inPromised Yieldover Four-year Periods
1900—1943 Agreed in Sign
SIGN










Same 11 10 7
1 2 5 5 10
Based on Table 23. In cases in which no change occurred in one of the
variables, the valuewas assigned to each category. For promised yields
in 1944, see Statistical Measures, Table 163.
for the six industry-size groups the number of times that the sign
of the change in average promised yield over the eleven four-year
periods was the same as that of the loss rate and the number of
times that it was opposite (a case when one of the variables did
not change being split as one-half "same" and one-half "oppo-
site"). As the table indicates, both for large and for small issues
the signs were the same in 28 out of 33 possible comparisons, re-
sults that are highly significant in the statistical sense. Exceptional
behavior occurred principally in 1936—39, for utilities and large
industrials.20 In other periods when the signs disagreed, either the
loss rate or the change in promised yield was very small.
Substantially the same results are obtained by an analysis based
on the yields of high-grade bonds and the quartiles of yield spreads
for other issues (see Chart 5 and Table 8). An examination of
20Thebehavior of the two groups in that period as shown in Table 23 is
particularly interesting. For each, the average promised yield fell, the default
rate was fairly low, and the proportion extinguished by call was large, all
conditions normally leading to high realized returns. Nevertheless, capital
losses were incurred because an appreciable volume of the bonds called had
been selling at or above their call prices at the beginning of the period. In.
vestors in effect erred in assuming that the issues would not be called promptly.CHRONOLOGICAL PERIODS 133
CHART 5—Selected Indicators of Capital Market Conditions and




































Yield spread range is the semi-interquartfle range (one-half the difference between
the first and third quartiles of yield on corporate bonds).
All series except loss rates ore from Table 7, first quarter data for quadrennial
years. Stock prices are represented by the Cowles Index, with Standard and Poor's
index for 1940 and 1944 chained to it. The index of business activity is a com-
posite of the A.T. & T., Ayres, and Persons indexes, each adjusted for economic
drift. High-grade bond yields are from the works of David Durand and Willis J.
Winn citedin Table 7.Loss rates are weighted averages for large issues from
Table 23.134 AGGREGATE EXPERIENCE
those data reveals that it is usually possible to classify the periods
unambiguously into two classes: periods of market appreciation,
and periods of market depreciation. As noted in Chapter 1, a fall
in basic yields on high-grade issues was usually associated with de-
clining yield spreads on lower-grade issues (a clustering up about
the basic rates), the two conditions jointly indicating a general
appreciation of bond market values. Conversely, a rise in basic
yields was usually associated with a fanning out of other yields,
both conditions indicating deteriorating investment values. Rat-
ings were assigned on that basis to each of the periods studied (see
the extreme right-hand column of Table 23). The period 1900—
1903 was classified as doubtful since basic rates rose while yield
spreads narrowed slightly, leaving the semi-interquartile range
virtually unchanged. In 1936—39 and 1928—39 the reverse situation
occurred as basic rates fell while spreads widened; but the market
was classified as deteriorating since the basic rate change affected
only the very highest-grade issues, and was clearly not representa-
tive of market behavior at that time. For the long periods 1920—39
and 1924—39 a similar situation was encountered, but the decline
in high-grade bond yields was so drastic that these periods were
classified as improving.
Twenty comparisons were made, for four-year periods from
1904 on, of the assigned directions of change in capital values and
the signs of the loss rates—ten for all large issues and ten for all
small. In all twenty cases the signs were in the directions antici-
pated: deteriorating capital market conditions were always paired
with positive ioss rates, and improving conditions with negative
loss rates. A glance at Table 23 will indicate that for longer pe-
riods of investment, the realized yields and loss rates were de-
pendent less upon bond market conditions on initial and terminal
dates, and more upon default and extinguishment status. Note
particularly the periods 1908—15, 1920—39, 1924—39, and 1932—39,
over which bond prices generally rose, but the market gains
were insufficient to offset default losses on particular issues.
The conclusion is that the successful short-term trader in cor-
porate bonds is primarily concerned with short-term changes in
general market conditions, and only secondarily concerned with
the problem of defaults and calls. The long-term investor, who
holds bonds from offering to extinguishment or over long chrono-
logical periods, is of course also influenced by the market: the
future course of interest rates affects the proportion of bondsCHRONOLOGiCAL PERIODS 135
called, the timing of calls, and in some cases the call price.21 Over
the long pull, however, the principal problem becomes one of
predicting defaults, since they are at the root of most long-term
capital losses. Even then, however, the loss may be reduced, if
not entirely eliminated, provided the investor is able to wait out
the default period. Moreover, as will be noted in subsequent chap-
ters, the long-term bond investor is not without guides in his
efforts to predict default risks on various types of securities.
High-grade Issues versus the Aggregates
One of the questions to which we shall return in later chapters is
that of the comparative returns on high-grade issues and on other
issues outstanding in the market. Interesting preliminary compari-
Sons may be made by calculating the rates of return obtained by a
hypothetical investor who purchased only the very top grade is-
sues (issues selling at the basic yields on high grades) and held
them over various chronological periods (Table 25). The table
was computed on the assumption of purchase of a thirty-year 4
percent coupon bond at the beginning of a stated period at a price
to yield the basic rate on thirty-year maturities, and sale at the end
of that period at a price to yield the basic rate on (30 —n)-year
maturities, where n is the length of the period. Such rates, of
course, take no account of default losses or call premiums, or of
deterioration in bond quality; they reflect solely changes in basic
yields over the in question. A comparison of the basic ex-
perience in Table 25 with that of all outstanding issues, as given
in Table 23, is summarized in Table 26. The results are expressed
in the form of simple unweighted means of the quadrennial yields
and loss rates for the eleven periods and of their variances about
the general means.22
21.Forissues with variable call premiums, the timing of the call can in-
fluence the call price.
22Sincethe unweighted means of Table 26 do not take account of changing
portfolio values in different periods, they should be interpreted simply as
convenient summary statistics arid not as measures of the returns actually
obtained by investors. The situation would be different if portfolio values
could be assumed stable, since an unweighted average of yields over successive
periods would then measure the over-all return on the investment. For ex-
ample, consider an investor who purchased a four-year Treasury note to yield
2 percent to maturity, and reinvested the proceeds at maturity in another
four-year note selling to yield 3 percent to maturity. Assuming that the latter
issue was not called before maturity, the annual realized rate of return at
simple interest for the eight years would be the unweighted average of yields,
or 21/2 percent. Our averages of quadrennial yields cannot be interpreted in136 AGGREGATE EXPERiENCE
TABLE 25—Yields and Loss Rates on Hypothetical High-grade
Bond Held over Four-year and Longer Periods of Invest-
ment, 1900—1943








1900—1903 3.30% 2.14% 1.16%
1904—1907 3.60 2.27 1.33
1908—1911 3.95 4.14 —0.19
1912—1915 3.90 3.33 0.57
1916—1919 4.05 0.25 3.80
1920—1923 5.10 6.65 —1.55
1924—1927 4.66 6.90 —2.24
1928—1931 4.05 1.73 2.32
1932—1935 4.70 10.60 —5.90
1936—1939 3.20 5.38 —2.18
1940—1943 2.70 3.12 —0.42
1900—1907 3.30 2.26 1.04
1900—1919 3.30 2.72 0.58
1908—1915 3.95 3.81 0.14
1920—1927 5.10 6.70 —1.60
1920—1931 5.10 .5.41 —0.31
1920—1939 5.10 5.95 —0.85
1924—1939 4.66 5.81 —1.15
1928—1939 4.05 5.44 —1.39
1932—1939 4.70 8.05 —3.35
Promised yields are from Basic Yields of Corporaie'Bonds, 1900—1942, by
DavidDurand, and Basic Yields of Bonds, 1926—1947: Their Measurement
and Pattern, by David Durand and Willis J. Winn (National Bureau of
Economic Research, Financial Research Program, 1942 and 1947, respectively).
Realized yields and loss rates were computed on the assumption of an issue
selling to yield the basic rate at both the beginning and end of the indicated
periods.
These materials indicate several persistent relationships among
the yields and loss rates. Promised yields on high grades were con-
sistently below those on large issues, while the latter were usually
below those on small issues (the averages are 3.9 percent for the
high grades, 5.5 percent for all large issues, and 6.3 percent for all
small). Interindustry comparisons for the quadrennial years show
that the average promised yields on small issues were above those
on the large twenty-one times out of thirty-three comparisons,
thatconvenient way since the investment valuesoftheaggregates change
from the beginning to the end of the periods.CHRONOLOGICAL PERIODS 187
were below eleven times, and were equal once. Cases of lower
promised yields on the small issues occurred most frequently in
the rail and industrial groups, where many of the smaller issues
were well secured as to earnings and assets. At the same time the
promised yields on all large issues were considerably more stable
than on all small (a variance of 1.8 percent for the large and 4.9
percent for the small). The small rails, however, were slightly more
stable than the large rails since many were well-secured divisional
issues. The promised yields on the best bonds were of course more
stable than on other groups (variance, 0.5 percent), since they con-
tained virtually no premium for default risk and were thus free of
variations arising from the changing speculative temper of the
market.
TABLE 26—Means and Variances of Quadrennial Yields and
















grade bond 3.9%4.2% —0.3%0.5%8.7%7.0%
Large Issues,
allindustries 5.5 4.9 0.6 1.8 16.19.6
Railroads 5.4 4.4 1.0 2.0 25.7 16.5
Public utilities 5.8 5.4 0.4 1.6 15.69.5
Industrials 6.1 6.1 0.0 5.1 16.1 6.1
Small Issues,
all industries 6.3 5.4 0.9 4.9 17.0 8.0
Railroads 5.4 4,7 0.7 1.4 16.3 10.0
Public utilities 6.2 5.6 0.6 3.2 14.46.3
Industrials 8.2 6.8 1.4 17.6 37.320.6
Based on Tables 23 and 25.
Most interesting relationships are shown among the realized
yields. For the four-year periods, the lowest average was obtained
on the high grades, and the highest on the small issues, with the
large issues occupying an intermediate position. The same rela-
tionships were found to prevail over most of the longer chrono-
logical periods. Among the industry groups, the rails turned in138 AGGREGATE EXPERiENCE
the poorest performance with respect to average realized yield,
and the industrials the best. As might be expected, the high grades
exhibit the greatest stability of realized yield (smallest variance)
and the small issues the least stability. The large issues, however,
were only slightly more stable than the small. The realized yields
on large rails and small industrials were particularly unstable; on
the other hand the large rails had an average level of realized
yields almost as low as the high grades, while the small industrials
had the highest level.
On the average, capital gains occurred only on the high-grade
issues, whereas capital losses were general for the market as a
whole. The tentative conclusion is that the highest returns were
obtained by investors who could afford to take the greatest risks.
Subsequent chapters will explore this matter further in an effort
to determine the extent to which realized returns and losses are
influenced by various aspects of investment quality.